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While most interpreters take the opening of De Anima III 2 (“Since we perceive that we see and hear 
[…]”) to be an oblique reference to some sort of conscious awareness, I argue that Aristotle intends 
to explain what I call ‘joint perception’: when conjoined with Aristotle’s subsequent claim that 
perceiving and being perceived are the same activity, the metaperception underpins the perception of 
a unified object. My interpretation is shown to have a more satisfactory account of the aporiai that 
follow. While I argue that the immediate focus of the metaperceptual account is joint perception, it 
may also be applicable to other kinds of complex (i.e. non-special) perception, which I briefly 
consider in the closing section.   
Aristotle opens De Anima [DA] III 2 by claiming that we perceive that we see and 
hear. Traditional interpretations read an allusion to conscious awareness here, and they 
understand Aristotle’s subsequent remarks as developments of his theory of consciousness.1 
In this paper I will suggest an alternative interpretation, according to which he has a different 
though equally ubiquitous perceptual phenomenon in mind: the unified perception of an 
object’s properties across sensory modalities, which I call ‘joint perception.’ Aristotle should 
feel an obligation to provide an account of joint perception, for Plato has argued in Theaetetus 
that the domain of perception is significantly restricted. Specifically, Plato claims that the 
senses can only perceive the objects proper to them: qualities that prima facie seem 
perceptible by more than one sense—his examples include being (ousia), sameness and 
difference, number, beauty and ugliness, and goodness and badness—are actually examined 
by the soul itself rather than perceived through the senses.2 Accordingly, Plato has Socrates 
1 Accounts diverge on what kind of conscious awareness is under consideration; I will return to this 
below; fn. 28.  
2 Plato uses several terms here for what the soul does in grasping these qualities, including dianoein 
[185a4, 185a9, 185b7], episkopein [185b5, 185c1, 185e2, 185e7], lambanein [185b8], skopein 
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 argue that our grasp of these common properties cannot be accomplished by any of the 
individual special senses. Rather, there must be some underlying psychological unity that 
brings the senses together with judgment. Plato thus rejects not only joint perception, but all 
complex perception, i.e. all activities of perception that go beyond the mere reception, by one 
of the five senses, of that sense’s paradigmatic—hereafter ‘special’—sense object. The 
appearance of unified perception actually arises from an examination of the sense contents 
of the special senses conducted by the soul itself, not by or through the sense organs. 
 But this conclusion is unacceptable to Aristotle. According to his theory of 
perception, there are many objects that are perceptible by multiple senses. He calls these the 
common objects (ta koina), and he takes them to include such features as magnitude, figure, 
motion, number, and, in some places at least, time.3 Similarly, Aristotle claims that the 
perceptual capacity is able to integrate information across the senses4, though he is not 
insensitive to the complications this introduces.5 Indeed, Aristotle’s biological taxonomy 
holds that non-human animals are limited to the perceptual and nutritive capacities, so doing 
justice to animal psychology will require ascribing complex activities to the perceptual 
capacity.6 But while Aristotle’s perceptual capacity must be more wide-ranging than Plato’s, 
it is not immediately clear how Aristotle justifies its expansion. Throughout the second half 
of De Anima Book II, Aristotle provides an account of each special sense in terms of its 
proper object, medium, and sense organ. In his presentation, the differences among the 
individual senses are stressed rather than minimized, yet joint perception (and other 
phenomena, including perception of the common objects and perceptual discrimination) 
requires a synthesis. Moreover, as we will see, the general metaphysical account that 
Aristotle gives of perception shares some fundamental commonalities with the Heraclitean 
                                                 
[185b10, 186a11], eporegein [186a4]. He explicitly distinguishes all such psychological activities 
from acts of perception at 186d7-e2. 
3 See DA III 1 425a14-16. While that list does not include time, Aristotle seems to indicate that time 
is a common object at De Memoria [DM] 1 450a9-15. 
4 See especially DA III 1 425a30-b2; De Sensu [DS] 7 449a2-10.  
5 DS 7 is given over to a discussion of the problems that confront any satisfactory account of cross-
modal perception; it will be discussed in §2. 
6 On perceptual sophistication, see R. Sorabji 1995.  
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 view that Plato presents in Theaetetus. What, then, entitles Aristotle to think that perception 
alone can accommodate complexity?7  
 According to the view defended below, Aristotle accounts for joint perception via the 
apparatus of metaperception. Aristotle would claim that I perceive a yellow, fluffy dog by 
virtue of having a single metaperception that combines the seeing of the color with the feeling 
of the fluffy fur. Although those qualities are generically different, Aristotle thinks that their 
being jointly actualized in a single activity is necessary and sufficient for their being jointly 
perceived, and, on my reading, he opens DA III 2 by showing that a metaperception of those 
qualities will have the requisite numerical singularity.  
 But before we can consider the adequacy of this account, it is necessary to get the 
Platonic problem in view. To that end, I first turn to the theory of perception on offer in 
Theaetetus and its commonalities with Aristotle’s own considered view. I conclude that 
Aristotle’s account of perception is prima facie vulnerable to the Platonic conclusion; I then 
provide what I take to be his reply, found in DA III 1 and De Sensu [DS] 7. Next, I support 
my interpretation of the opening of DA III 2 through consideration of its immediate context 
and the attendant aporiai.  By the end of the paper, I hope to have shown that Aristotle has a 
substantive and parsimonious account of how the perceptual capacity, given its physical and 
formal limitations, is able to account for the richness of perceptual experience that joint 
perception requires. I will close with some remarks about the applicability of the 
metaperceptual framework to other activities of perception that go beyond the perception of 
the special objects by the special senses, but to fully explore the connection between those 
other activities, common sensing, and joint perception would go beyond the scope of the 
paper.  
 
A Problem: Theaetetus’s Rejection of Unified Perception 
  
 Theaetetus’s final refutation of empiricism begins at 184b with Socrates asking 
Theaetetus to be precise in the way he describes the relationship between the sense-organs 
                                                 
7 Sorabji 1995: 195-196 and Gregoric 2006: 1-6 both stress the tension between the intellectualist 
conclusion of Theaetetus 184-186 and Aristotle’s more wide-ranging conception of perception. 
McCabe 2007: 165-168 also compares Aristotle’s position to that found in this section of Theaetetus, 
but, in accord with her general approach, her focus is on the origin of judgment. 
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 and the activity of perceiving: do we see with or through the eyes? What looks to be a trifling 
grammatical issue is, he insists, philosophically significant. Socrates is attempting to 
determine who or what, properly speaking, does the perceiving: do the organs (or the senses) 
engage in perception, such that we see simply when the relevant organ or faculty does? Or 
does perception require something beyond a functioning sense or sense-organ? If the former, 
disjoint special sensing exhausts our awareness; if the latter, sophistication enters into the 
system somewhere: there is a central unified faculty that takes our special sense perceptions 
as data. 
 The explanandum here is the unity of the perceiving subject. For, Socrates continues, 
if we perceive with the senses rather than through them, our experience will be like that of a 
Trojan Horse, wherein a seemingly single subject is actually several discrete ones. Since it is 
clear that our experience is not fragmented, it must be that our senses are somehow united 
within the soul. It is concluded that all perceptible objects will be cognized by or with that 
point of convergence rather than by or with the individual senses—though of course the 
senses themselves will play an important role, which Socrates describes by saying that the 
senses are instruments or equipment (organa) through which we perceive [184d4]. He 
concludes that the point of convergence is provided by the soul by itself [185e1-2], i.e., not 
through a sense-organ. While the perceptual data collected through the sense-organs will be 
the information that is manipulated by the soul by itself, the ultimate psychological account 
of the unity of perceptual experience will have to appeal to a non-perceptual capacity of soul.  
However, before Socrates can draw this conclusion, he makes a crucial assumption, which 
motivates the anti-empiricist conclusion. At 184e8-185a2, Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree 
that what is perceived through one sense is not perceived through another. What seems to be 
a fairly innocuous claim about the special objects—one can’t hear colors—proves to be 
bolder and more far-reaching than it first appears. Socrates continues by observing that, given 
this constraint, the unified perception of two or more generically different objects is 
impossible. Specifically, he claims that while we think both a sound and a color have being 
(ousia) [185a8-9], their being cannot be perceived.8 Other common qualities that turn out, on 
                                                 
8 Though it is clear that the conclusion of Plato’s argument is that knowledge cannot simply be a 
matter of perception, exactly what notion of ousia is in play has been widely disputed. Cornford 1957 
interprets it as a reference to Platonic Forms, a view that was refuted by Cooper 1970. Various 
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 this view, to be non-perceptible include the perception of sameness/difference that underlies 
joint perception and perceptual discrimination [185a11-12], number [185b2], 
likeness/unlikeness [185b4-5], beauty/ugliness, and goodness/badness [186a9]. None of 
these, Socrates argues, can be perceived [185e6-9], given the assumption that what is 
perceptible by one sense is not perceptible by another [185b7-9].  
 But while the premise that what is perceptible by one sense is not perceptible by 
another is plausible when restricted to the special objects, it becomes much less so when it is 
generalized to all possible perceptual objects. However, Socrates draws conclusions not just 
about the special objects, but also about our grasp of qualities like sameness and difference, 
so it is apparent that the premise applies more generally.9 This introduces a problem: why 
would Socrates think that all perceptible features work like the special ones? Though it does 
sound odd to say that one can feel a color, the same discomfort does not seem to arise with 
the claim that you can both see and feel shape.  
 Since Theaetetus accepts the premise without argument, we cannot look to the text to 
find the motivation. However, the principle can clearly be shown to follow from the theory 
of perception forwarded earlier in Theaetetus. According to that view, which Socrates 
describes as Heraclitean, everything is in constant motion. As such, perception too will be a 
kind of motion: it arises when active powers meet passive powers. As described in 156d3-
                                                 
alternative interpretations have been offered: see especially Burnyeat 1976: 44; Burnyeat 1990: 59-
61; Cooper 1970; Kahn 1981; Modrak 1981. Fortunately, precisely what Plato has in mind when he 
employs ousia is not relevant in the context of this paper: what matters for my purposes is the 
inference from the fact that ousia is not specific to a special sense to the conclusion that it is not 
perceived at all. 
9 Burnyeat 1976 argues that Socrates only needs a weaker premise, to the effect that the special objects 
of different senses cannot be compared perceptually (see also Burnyeat 1990: 57). And indeed, 
Socrates opens with just such an example: it is not by sight or by hearing, he says, that we are able to 
compare a color with a sound (185a-c). However, contrary to Burnyeat, Socrates must be committed 
to the stronger claim that the senses cannot share any objects. The conclusion that Socrates draws is 
not merely that we cannot know by perception that the sense objects of two modalities are similar to 
or different from one another. Instead, he concludes that perception is never sufficient for knowledge 
(oud’ ar’ [metestin] epistêmês [186e7]), and this is so because perception cannot grasp the being 
(ousia) that underlies our ability to grasp truth. Thus, though the opening example involves a 
comparison of two sense objects, Plato is committed to the view that just as I cannot see that both a 
color and sound are, neither can I see that a color is. For if I could, then I could perceive (some cases 
of) being, and therefore (some cases of) truth, which would allow for (some cases of) knowledge by 
perception.  
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 157e7, the force or process external to the perceiver is the active power that constitutes 
perception, and the perceiver’s own (dynamic) sense-organ is the associated passive power. 
There are slow localized motions, which are processes that originate from the perceived 
object (active) and the perceiver (passive), and swift intervening motions, which move 
through the space between the perceiver and the external object.10  
 The result of this interaction, Socrates says at 156a7-b2, is a ‘twin birth.’ The 
intercourse of passive and active forces will produce yet another pair of forces: a perception, 
on the one hand, and the object of perception on the other. According to the Heraclitean view, 
a difference in the active and passive powers that meet will entail a difference in the product. 
For example, the products that arise from the intercourse between a white stone and an eye 
must be different from the products of that stone interacting with the skin, and this is so 
because the organs—skin and eye—are different.11 Since eyes and ears are themselves 
different, there can be no offspring that is the same for both, so there can be no shared 
perceptions. For the same reason, the common objects—objects which are supposed to 
remain the same regardless of what modality or modalities are perceiving them—must be 
denied existence as perceptible objects. 
 So if Heracliteanism is the right view of the metaphysics of perception, it is clear that 
the senses will only perceive their paradigmatic objects.12 That view of the domain of 
perception is too sparse for Aristotle’s purposes. But there are reasons to think his view is 
                                                 
10 Talk of objects is misleading if taken to imply stability over time: constant change precludes such 
objects. Though he acknowledges that he struggles with following the rule himself, Socrates says that 
one ought not to describe this picture using the verb-to-be: the ‘state’ of constant flux precludes any 
stability such as would be necessary for existence across any time whatever (157b-c) 
11 See also Theaetetus 156d3-6: “when, then, an eye and some other of the things commensurate with 
it which has come up to it, generate both whiteness and the perception naturally associated with it, 
things which would at no time have come to be if either of them approached something else” 
[emphasis added]. 
12 Bernard Williams offers an alternative reading of Theaetetus, explicated by Burnyeat in his 
introduction to [1990], according to which the Heraclitean theory of perception is not accepted by 
Plato but is rather part of a reductio of Protagorean relativism. I will not address the alternate reading 
here: for the purposes of my argument it suffices to show that the claim that nothing is perceptible by 
more than one sense does follow from Heraclitean premises. I do not need to establish it as the only 
possible motivation, or even as Plato’s motivation. As we will see, Aristotle accepts key parts of the 
Heraclitean picture, so he is prima facie forced into the conclusion that Plato draws here, whether for 
the same or different reasons. 
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 perilously close to that described in Theaetetus: Aristotle’s metaphysics of perception shares 
some central features with Heracliteanism. First, Aristotle does accept the weaker form of 
the principle adduced at 184c, according to which the special objects are not able to be 
perceived by the other special senses.13 While that weaker form was shown to be insufficient 
motivation for the wholesale rejection of empiricism14, it would nonetheless appear to make 
joint perception problematic. Joint perception requires the synthesis of discrete sensory 
modalities, which is seemingly precluded even by the weaker principle.15 Secondly, 
Aristotle’s theory of perception says that one activity constitutes both the perceiving of an 
object and that object’s being perceived [425b26-27]: where Socrates had a ‘twin birth,’ 
Aristotle has an only child.16 If Plato thinks that the interdependence that follows from a twin 
birth prevents the senses from sharing objects, then he will be wary of any position that 
permits shared objects yet claims an identity between the activity of the perceiver and the 
perceived. Given these similarities, then, and given the dialectical position Aristotle finds 
himself in as a student of Plato’s, we would expect him to feel compelled to offer some 
account of how, contra Plato, unified perception is possible: how it is that a single perceptual 
activity can actualize multiple perceptual potentialities? Mere assertion will not suffice.  
 In what follows, I will argue that Aristotle does give such an account immediately 
following the introduction of joint perception and perception of the common objects in DA 
                                                 
13 legô d’ idion men ho mê endechetai hetera aisthêsei aisthanesthai (DA II 6 418a11-12).  
14 See fn. 9. 
15 In fact Aristotle further weakens the claim from DA II 6 418a11 right before his discussion of joint 
perception, saying instead that the special senses perceive each other’s objects coincidentally (ta d’ 
allêlôn idia kata sumbebêkos aisthanontai hai aesthêsis [425a30-31]). Thus it is clear that Aristotle 
himself recognizes some tension between the weak principle and the possibility of joint perception. 
He goes on to elaborate on the way in which the special senses perceive each other’s objects: not as 
they are individually but insofar as they are unified (ouk hê<i> autai, all’ hê<i> mia [425a31]). The 
account of their unity is the subject of the next two sections of this paper. 
16 This is an instance of the Aristotle’s general metaphysical account of activity and passivity, 
described in detail at Phys. III 3, according to which active and passive potentialities are jointly 
actualized within the passive agent. Marmodoro 2014 does not accept the standard interpretation of 
this passage: since she thinks actualities cannot actualize multiple potentialities, she has a different 
account (45ff). It might additionally be thought that since Aristotle defines potentialities in terms of 
actualities, it will not be possible for distinct potentialities to be jointly actualized. However, the 
parasitism of potentiality on actuality only necessitates that no two separate potentialities be always 
jointly-actualized. Aristotle clearly countenances multiple instantiations both via regular locutions 
like “one in number, different in being”, and also at Physics III.3 202b8-10.  
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 III 1 and just before the introduction of discrimination at the end of III 2. In the next section, 
I show that Aristotle thinks joint perception occurs if and only if there is a single activity of 
perception that actualizes diverse perceptual potentialities. Once that is established, I will 
argue that the reference to metaperceiving that opens DA III 2 is meant to introduce the idea 
that, given Aristotle’s underlying metaphysics of activity and passivity, it is entirely possible 




 Perhaps the most obvious way in which perceptual experience would be 
impoverished if we were restricted to special sensing is that we would no longer be able to 
have cross-modal perceptions. Instead, each modality would perceive discretely: we would, 
for example, see yellow, hear barking, and feel fur yet we would not grasp just through 
perception that all three qualities inhere in one and the same thing. Socrates describes this 
perverse possibility in Theaetetus by means of the analogy with a Trojan horse: if our access 
to the world were to stop at special sensing, our experience would be disjoint. There would 
be no single subject of those disjoint perceptions: since each Trojan horse is merely a 
container, the subjects would be as many and varied as the senses themselves. Fortunately it 
is evident that we have not suffered this cruel fate, so the senses must be centrally integrated. 
As we have seen, Plato has Socrates and Theaetetus conclude that the point of convergence 
is to be found in the soul ‘itself by itself’ (autê di’ hautês), i.e., not through body parts, and 
therefore not through the senses.  
 Aristotle, on the other hand, views perceptual unity as a feature of the perceptual 
faculty. In DA III 1, for instance, he describes a case where bitter, yellow bile is perceived.17 
Here Aristotle is nearing the conclusion of his discussion of the perceptual part of soul. After 
reviewing the special senses, their special objects, and the media that physically underlie 
perception by the special senses, he turns to facets of perception that have not yet been 
addressed, including the perception of the common objects that he first introduced in DA II 
                                                 
17 Perceiving something as having multiple perceptible properties, at least in the sense Aristotle has 
in mind, does not require the possession of concepts of those properties any more than special sensing 
does. Just as I can see a yellow thing without having the concept <yellow>, I can perceive a yellow 
bitter thing without having the concepts of <yellow> and <bitter>. 
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 6. Unlike the special objects, which were already discussed in detail in later parts of Book II, 
the common objects are perceptible by multiple senses. The fact that these objects can be 
shared across the senses implies, according to Aristotle, that the senses are sensitive to each 
other’s objects, which in turn requires that the senses themselves form a unity. As he puts it, 
‘The senses perceive each other’s special objects coincidentally, not as they [the senses] [are] 
in themselves, but as a unity, when perception of the same object happens simultaneously, 
e.g. of bile that it is bitter and yellow (for it is not the task of another [perception]18 to say 
that both are one’ [425a30-b3].  
 It will not be enough for Aristotle simply to assert that one can in fact perceive the 
sense-objects of different modalities as unified: given the objections found in Theaetetus, he 
will have to show how we grasp cross-modal sense objects in a way that does not require any 
capacity of soul beyond those provided by the perceptual faculty. In DA III 1’s brief 
discussion quoted above, we see part of Aristotle’s explanation of joint perception. Bile is 
perceived as both bitter and yellow in a single act of perception, which in turn requires that 
the senses themselves are fundamentally unified. In his much fuller discussion of joint 
perception in DS 7, he again observes that the senses must be one [449a8-9], and he provides 
more detail on how it is that the senses are able to act as one. This chapter, the closing one 
of De Sensu, examines how it is possible to perceive a complex-but-unified visual object—
one that includes a variety of perceptible properties. Aristotle frames the discussion by asking 
‘whether or not one can perceive two things at once’ [447a12-14]. His answer is in the 
negative, but as we have seen from the case of bitter, yellow bile, he does not deny the 
phenomenon that we would tend to describe in this way. While he rejects the idea that what 
is really being perceived is two or more things, he nonetheless does acknowledge that we are 
able to perceive a complex object in one and the same moment.  
 Indeed, according to Aristotle, it is precisely because there is only one underlying 
activity that the object is grasped as a single thing. The quotation from DA III 1—‘it is not 
[the responsibility] of any further [perception] to say that both are one’—evinces a 
                                                 
18 425a31-b2. The proper referent of heteras (another) is ambiguous. It is in the feminine, but beyond 
that the text does not specify what further thing is not needed. While I have chosen ‘perception’, it 
could also be taken to refer to the sense. Hamlyn 2002 uses ‘perception’ (which he argues for in 
Hamlyn 1968: 200), but Hicks 1907 and Ross 1961 choose ‘sense’.   
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 commitment to the view that there being one perception is sufficient for there seeming to be 
one perception. For here something ‘says’ that the bitter and the yellow are one, and if it is 
not a further perception, it must be the same one.19 But DS 7 also argues the converse: there 
being a single perception is also necessary for there seeming to be one. Aristotle here claims, 
as I will show below, that if there are two or more numerically distinct perceptions, they 
cannot appear to be one, i.e., they cannot pronounce their object(s) as one. Thus, a 
perception’s being numerically single is, for Aristotle, both necessary and sufficient for its 
appearing to be single. 
 Aristotle’s argument in DS 7 depends on his claim that only one activity of perception 
can occur at a time. To this end, he first argues that simultaneous perception of special objects 
that are the same in kind is only possible insofar as they come together to form a mixture 
[447b6-14].20 For, he says, if they are understood as discrete objects perceived 
simultaneously, their respective movements (kinêseis) would cancel each other out [447a29-
b6]. Next he claims that simultaneous-but-numerically-distinct perception is also impossible 
                                                 
19 See also DS 7 447b24-25: “For we pronounce an object to be numerically one simply because it is 
simultaneously perceived.” 
20 The contention that the special objects of one sense are only co-perceptible insofar as they form a 
mixture has been taken by some to mean that, e.g., black and white must unite to form a new color in 
order to be perceived together (see esp. Ross 1961: 229-230). We must bear in mind different kinds 
of mixture, though. One type of mixture, like a cake mixture, occurs when disparate elements 
irreversibly combine to form something new. We also talk, though, of mixing things by putting them 
in different structural combinations—combinations which may be reversible—as in a trail mix. LSJ 
supports this ambiguity: its second definition of meignumai is: “generally, join, bring together, in 
various ways”. Aristotle’s most systematic discussion of mixture is in Generation and Corruption 
I.10, where he says that the things that are mixed are not destroyed, but rather continue to exist in 
potentiality (327b23-5). Since Marmodoro 2014 has a largely physiological account of perceptual 
alteration, she understands this in the cake-mixture sense (219). To the contrary, I contend that his 
account suggests the trail-mix sense, and that the trail-mix view of mixture fits better with received 
facts about what it is possible to perceive (Lorenz 2009 interprets Aristotle similarly). On the narrower 
interpretation, I would be unable to see a chess board (Pavel Gregoric 2006’s example (141)), since 
the black and white squares are not mixed in the former sense. It certainly seems improbable that 
Aristotle would be insensitive to the kind of perceptual object exemplified by the chess board. One 
may rightly describe the board as being made of two colors, just as one may distinguish the banana 
chips from the sunflower seeds in a bag of trail mix. Similarly, in the cross-modal case, one may 
break up the color of the tree from the feel of the bark. As we will see when we get to the conclusion 
of DS 7, each of these claims is true because the being of the components is different. Nonetheless, 
they are unified in the sense that all are parts of one unity, be it one bag of trail mix, or, in the 
perceptual case, one object of simultaneous perception. While the components of the latter have 
distinct potentialities, they are jointly actualized in a single activity of the perceptual faculty. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.13, n.1. p. 147-180, 2019. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i1p147-180 
156
 in the case of perception of objects of different special senses: since objects of diverse genera 
are even more unlike each other than are contraries of a single genus, it follows that if the 
objects of one sense cannot be simultaneously perceived, then neither can those of different 
senses [448a13-19].  
 Indeed, for Aristotle, there are independent methodological reasons to reject multiple 
simultaneous acts of perception: since discrete-but-simultaneous activities would require 
distinct potentialities being actualized, this view would lead to an unacceptable multiplication 
of faculties. If I simultaneously-but-separately perceive two colors, for example, their being 
separate would require that different parts of me were responsible for each perception.21  
Thus, I would have one part that potentially sees one color, and another part that potentially 
sees the other. Moreover, since that which has the potential to see white also has the potential 
to see black, it would follow that I have several specifically-identical but numerically-distinct 
faculties [448b22-25]. Such a view would clearly conflict with Aristotle’s general 
commitment to parsimony in nature. 
 So simultaneous perception of multiple objects is not possible according to Aristotle, 
and this is so regardless of whether the objects are special objects of the same sense or of 
different senses. But couldn’t it be that the objects are perceived discretely and only seem to 
be simultaneous? Aristotle goes on to consider this view, as exemplified by some (unnamed) 
students of music who claim that ‘notes do not reach us together but only seem to do so, and 
that this escapes our notice by [occurring] over an imperceptible time’ [448a20-21]. The idea 
behind this suggestion is familiar enough: what if we perceive a variety of objects at different 
times, which we then synthesize? While we clearly do not experience our perceptions as 
disjoint, isn’t it possible that time does pass between different perceptions but the time lapse 
is so swift that we don’t perceive its passage?  
 Aristotle rejects this view, for he claims that there cannot be imperceptible moments 
of time [448a24-30]. His argument here depends on the solution to Zeno’s paradoxes that we 
find in Physics IV. There he says that while time is potentially infinitely divisible, it also 
exists as a continuum. As a continuum, all parts of it are perceived and no parts are 
                                                 
21 These parts would not have to be spatially-divided; to call them ‘parts’ is merely a façon de parler. 
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 unperceived; accordingly, there are no imperceptible points in time.22 So since this rival 
explanation depends on the actual existence of imperceptibly short periods of time, it cannot 
get off the ground. 
 In any event, if Aristotle were to countenance the existence of multiple sequential 
perceptions, he would likely end up saddled with an intellectualist view like the one Socrates 
adopts in Theaetetus. If the activities through which we apprehend the whiteness and 
blackness of the chessboard were discrete, a separate account would be needed of our 
apprehension of the unity of the chessboard itself. Socrates is considering a similar problem 
in Theaetetus when he concludes that such apprehension requires an additional act of mind. 
Thus, Aristotle would not be likely to evade intellectualism if he went down the path that the 
musicians have trodden. 
 Given these considerations, Aristotle is drawn to the converse of his sufficiency claim 
from De Anima: if apparent simultaneity requires actual simultaneity, then the apparent 
simultaneity of joint perception will necessitate actual simultaneity. Since, moreover, 
Aristotle takes himself to have shown that only one perception can happen at any one time, 
it will follow that the perception that constitutes joint perception must be numerically 
single.23 It is a recurring theme in DS 7 that a unified and simultaneous perception asserts the 
unity of its object. At 447b14-15, for instance, he says “Therefore if the actual perception is 
a single one, the two objects will be pronounced to be one”.24 Here Aristotle commits to the 
view that joint perception must take place at one time. And since, as he also argues in this 
                                                 
22 Phys. IV.11, 218b27-9. Coope 2005: 37-41 denies that Aristotle should be interpreted as claiming 
that all passage of time is perceptible, but she also notes that this is the usual reading (40). Her 
argument against the default interpretation turns, moreover, on her claim that Aristotle is nowhere 
else committed to the impossibility of imperceptible time lapses. The present discussion—not 
mentioned in her book—explicitly expresses just such a commitment at 448a24-25 (oud’ endechetai 
chronon einai anaisthêton oudena oude lanthanein) and 448b16-17 (hoti men oun outheis esti 
chromos anaisthêtos, ek toutôn phaneron).  
23 Marmodoro 2014 also says that joint perception (and discrimination) requires a single, unified 
activity of perception (190-193). She considers several models of how the common sense would be 
oriented to accomplish this and other of its functions and finds each wanting. She does not consider 
an account in terms of metaperception, likely because she does not interpret Aristotle’s claim that 
perceiver and perceived are one in number as contending that there is one token activity that 
comprises both (see fn. 16), and so she would not see the metaperceptual account as providing for a 
single activity of perception.  
24 See also 447b24-5; 448a8-11.  
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 chapter, only one perceptual activity can occur at a time, it follows that joint perception must 
implicate exactly one activity.25 
 To be sure, joint perception will not have been explained unless my potential to 
perceive includes the potential to perceive complex tableaux in a single activity—not just 
specifically different across a single sense, but also generically different across multiple 
senses. Aristotle accounts for this in his typical style, viz. by ascribing the complexity to the 
sophistication of the perceptual faculty. He elaborates on his resolution at DS 7 449a8-20, 
where he says: 
 It is necessary, then, that there is some one [faculty] of the soul by which it perceives 
everything, as said before, but [it perceives] different kinds through different [parts]. Is it that 
when actually undivided it is one thing that perceives white and sweet, but when actually 
separated two? Or does the position about the soul correspond to the one about the objects?—
for numerically one thing is white and sweet, and also many other things. For even if the 
affections are not separable from each other, each is different in being. The same should now 
be assumed concerning the soul: the sense faculty that perceives all is numerically one, but 
its being differs, in some cases generically and in others specifically. Thus [we] can perceive 
simultaneously with one and the same [faculty], but its account is not the same. (Translation 
from Ross 1955, with some modifications) 
 Here Aristotle considers two options, and he adopts the second alternative. He 
contends that his metaphysics, with its commitment to non-transcendent forms immanent in 
matter, explains joint perception in a way analogous to the way in which it accommodates 
unified mind-independent objects. In the case of a yellow, fluffy dog, the dog exists as a 
single thing, even though its perceptible qualities can be considered individually. What it is 
to be yellow is different from what it is to be furry. Nonetheless, the dog itself exists as a 
unity in a strong sense: it is one object. So while the potential to be furry and the potential to 
                                                 
25 Gregoric 2006 makes a similar observation. As he puts it, “First, of an object which is one in number 
there is one act of perception […] Second, in one act of perception the perceived object is pronounced 
to be one in number […] Third, one act of perception occurs at one time, that is, at a time which is 
indivisible” (132). He describes these as corollaries that follow from the numerical unity of perceiver 
and perceived. On my reading, which follows the order of dialectic in DA III 1-2 425a30-426a1, the 
second condition follows from the first, and both set a prerequisite for an adequate theory of unified 
perception. The numerical unity of the activity of the perceiver and the perceived object is then 
brought in to satisfy that requirement.  
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 be yellow are generically different potentials, they are jointly actualized in the dog. As such, 
the dog is one in number, but multiple in account.  
 According to Aristotle, my perception of an object is single-but-complex in a way 
analogous to the way in which the dog is. Just as the dog has various physical characteristics, 
it also has various perceptual potentialities: the potential to be seen as yellow, to be heard 
barking, to feel soft to the touch, etc. These potentialities, which vary both specifically and 
generically, are jointly actualized in one perception. We can see, then, that joint perception 
in the case of an object requires no more than a numerically single perceptual activity that is 
subject to a complex description.26 The analogy with the dog makes clear that we are familiar 
with this type of complexity in other contexts: our perception of the dog as yellow and furry 
will be one to the same extent as the dog itself is. The dog is one thing that actualizes multiple 
potentialities. So too, my perception of that dog is also one in number but multiple in account. 
It is Aristotle’s considered stance, then, that the perceptual faculty, like the dog, is 
fundamentally unified. It is not constituted by five discrete senses making up a mereological 
sum. As with a dog actively being perceived, these parts are not separable from the whole: 
in a case of joint perception, the perceived instance of yellow in the dog is not separable from 
its perceived fluffiness. Similarly, while what it is to be sight (and what it is to see) is different 
from what it is to be touch (and what it is to feel), sight and touch are numerically identical 
to each other and to the perceptual faculty as a whole: thus, while they are the same in 
number, they differ in account.  
 One may reasonably wonder how a single perceptual activity could include content 
from different modalities. Indeed, it is this concern that motivates the entire chapter of DS 
under discussion. As we saw, the ‘students of music’ that Aristotle discusses at 448a19ff 
deny that it is possible and instead contend that there are discrete perceptual acts that take 
                                                 
26 In order for the view to be plausible, Aristotle must not be thinking of physical change in the organs 
as constitutive of sensing, for in that case, given that seeing yellow and hearing barking depend on 
different parts of the body, they could not be identical. Nonetheless, rejecting that constitution claim 
does not commit Aristotle to denying the presence of any physical change in the organ. In fact, a 
qualitative alteration of the organ could be correlated with an act of perception. Further, given our 
particular material constitution, that alteration may prove to be a necessary condition for a successful 
perception. Thus, my reading can afford to remain neutral as to whether there are any physiological 
changes during perception for Aristotle, though it is committed to denying that any such alteration 
just is the act of perceiving. For a discussion of the controversy, see Burnyeat 1995a; Burnyeat 1995b; 
Burnyeat 2001; Caston 2005; Johansen 2007; Sorabji 1975.  
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 place at imperceptibly different times. In response to that view, Aristotle rejects the 
possibility of imperceptible time differences, and so he claims that any perceptual content 
that seems to have been perceived simultaneously is in fact perceived simultaneously. 
Moreover, since Aristotle contends that only one perceptual act can occur at a time, it follows 
that simultaneous perception must also be numerically singular. Of course a numerically 
single perception, which represents its complex object as unified, must further represent that 
object as a complex one. For example, when I perceive a dog, I perceive it as one thing, but 
one thing that has many generically- and specifically-different qualities. How it is that 
Aristotle thinks he is entitled to permit perceptual activities that are one in number but 
instantiate numerous potentialities has yet to be seen, but that such unity is possible in the 
non-perceptual case has already been established by the case of actual mind-independent 
objects. We can conclude, then, that the possibility of joint perception requires that the 
perceptual faculty be somehow able to engage in numerically single perceptual activities with 
complex contents. What remains to be explained is how it is possible for a single activity to 
actualize those multiple perceptual potentialities. If Aristotle can accommodate that 
possibility without going beyond the framework provided by his general account of 
perception, then he will have shown that the perceptual capacity alone suffices for joint 
perception, contrary to Plato’s conclusion in Theaetetus.  
 
How is Joint Perception Possible? The Metaperceptual Account 
The Joint Perception Reading of DA III 2 425b12-17 
 
 Aristotle’s account of joint perception will have to proceed via the positing of a 
numerically single activity that actualizes diverse potentialities. But we also saw that Plato, 
through Socrates, questions whether perceptual unity is even possible. For if, as Plato thinks, 
perception relies heavily on the relationship between the sense and the external object that 
causes the perception, it will be prima facie unlikely, maybe even impossible, for distinct 
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 types of perceptual potentialities to be jointly actualized. It is incumbent on Aristotle not just 
to claim that we engage in joint perception, but also to explain how we do so.27  
 I argue that Aristotle accounts for the possibility of joint perception via the invocation 
of a metaperceptual apparatus. Just a few lines after discussing the unified perception of 
bitter, yellow bile, he opens DA III 2 with the following observation and its attendant aporiai: 
[Joint Perception [JP]]: [A] Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary [that it is] 
by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense]. [B] But [then] the same [sense] 
would be of sight and of the color that is the subject [of sight], with the result that either there 
will be two [senses] for the same thing, or [the sense] itself will be of itself. [C] Yet if the 
sense for sight were indeed different [from sight] either there will be an infinite regress or 
some sense will be of itself. So we should admit this of the first [in the series]. (425b12-17, 
Hamlyn 2002 translation, with some modifications) 
 My reading of this passage, which I call the ‘Joint Perception Reading’ or ‘JPR’, 
interprets Aristotle as invoking joint perception at [JP:A]. In contrast, traditional readings 
take it that Aristotle is here referring to conscious awareness. I call all such readings 
‘Awareness Readings’, abbreviated ‘AR’.28 The differences among AR accounts, though 
substantial, are orthogonal to my criticism, which turns on one thing they all have in common, 
viz. that by invoking an opaque context, they are unable to motivate the aporiai.29 
                                                 
27 The problem is more severe if the relation turns on physiological facts about the organ, as it seems 
to for Socrates in Theaetetus, but it is present even if we take a more circumspect view about the role 
of the organ in perception.  
28 Arguments for versions of AR are given by Aquinas 1999; Caston 2002; Hicks 1907; Johansen 
2002; Kahn 1975; Kosman 1975; and Osborne 1983. Kosman takes pre-reflective self-consciousness 
to be at issue, while Caston takes it to be awareness of the experience. Johansen, on the other hand, 
understands Aristotle to be concerned with reflective self-consciousness. Osborne might be thought 
to be an exception, since she takes the explanandum to be our awareness that we are seeing as opposed 
to hearing, but note that this is still a form of awareness, albeit one that has not engaged many 
contemporary philosophers of mind. Gregoric 2006 takes a similar line, reading the passage as 
concerned with awareness of the whether the senses are in operation, as does Polansky 2007, who 
describes the explanandum as “self-awareness of the senses” (380). Marmodoro 2014 translates 
aisthanometha in this passage as ‘we are aware’, and implies that she takes self-awareness to be at 
issue (196). AR is assumed by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones; Everson 1997; Kahn 1975; 
and Modrak 1987. 
29 I will not be addressing in detail McCabe 2007’s view, which agrees with mine in denying that 
consciousness is the explanandum of the passage but is otherwise significantly different. On her view, 
Aristotle brings up higher-order perception not as a gloss on consciousness but because he is trying 
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  The popularity of AR is easily explained: to contemporary ears steeped in higher-
order views of consciousness, the claim that we perceive that we see and hear is naturally 
read as invoking the phenomenon of consciousness. But perceptual consciousness was not a 
topic of philosophical analysis in Aristotle’s time, and I argue that [JP:A] could equally well 
be a gloss on joint perception of an object. To illustrate, let’s take our standard example: my 
perception of a dog. This perception includes an array of perceptual information. What 
requires explanation is how I am able to be aware of this array as a unitary phenomenon. 
Aristotle's answer to this question, I argue, is that the perceptual faculty, in addition to 
perceiving those shapes, colors, sounds, etc., also has the potential to perceive those 
individual perceptions. I undergo countless seeings of diverse colors as well as hearings of 
particular sounds, and so on. But I also unite those perceptions in a single unitary act, an act 
that must itself be a perception if Platonic intellectualism is to be avoided, and which 
therefore ought to be described as a perception of my seeings and hearings.30  
 So interpreted, the opening of DA III 2 should be understood as alluding to any of the 
following: (1) ‘Since we perceive that the dog is yellow and barking’; (2) ‘Since we perceive 
that we see and hear the dog; or, more generally, (3) ‘Since we perceive an object as a unity 
of distinct perceptible properties.’ Given, as I argued above, that Aristotle believes he can 
account for joint perception iff there is a single perceptual activity that has a complex content, 
JPR predicts that Aristotle will invoke a numerically single state here as well. In other words, 
if JPR is right to take the reference to metaperception as an appeal to the general phenomenon 
of joint perception, then the solution Aristotle will give to the aporiai should be expected to 
                                                 
to argue that perception can be transitive, contra Charmides. Once it is seen that perception can be 
transitive—and, it turns out, reflexive—this allows for us to judge (krinein) by perception, which then 
allows for a variety of perceptual activity. Though joint perception is among the activities in question, 
McCabe mentions it only in passing and always in a list of other examples. She also explicitly 
suggests that the variety of activities in question will not have much to unite them (163, passim), 
whereas I expect that joint perception and other activities will have a great deal in common—in fact, 
all will rely on metaperception, and will be activities of the common sense. I will not be able to 
establish the latter point in this paper, but for some of the central motivation, see §4. 
30 It might be thought that joint perception requires a perception of the colors and sounds as one rather 
than a perception of the perception of the colors and sounds as one. However, recall that what is being 
explained is the unity of perception, not the unity of the objects of perception. If I am to have a single 
perception of a multi-faceted dog, it is crucial that my perception of its colors is the same activity as 
my perception of its sounds, and so on.  
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 invoke the same numerically single activity as that mentioned in the previous chapter of DA 
and in DS 7. And indeed, as we will see below, DA III 2 goes on to do just that. 
 I will defend JPR in the next few sections. First, I show that JPR provides a better 
motivation than AR for the aporiai taken to follow from the fact that we perceive that we see 
and hear. Second, I show that Aristotle’s resolution of those aporiai appeals to the same 
consideration, viz. token identity, as I have argued is required for the explanation of joint 
perception. Third, I briefly argue that it is anachronistic to expect Aristotle to have a concern 
with conscious awareness. I conclude that the metaperceptual apparatus described in DA III 
2 is offered as a way for Aristotle to account for the possibility of joint perception, in spite 
of Plato’s reservations. As such, it is a crucial part of the defensibility of Aristotle’s picture, 
a fact that is missed when the reference to perceiving that we see and hear is taken to 
designate consciousness. The metaperceptual account likely has applications to other 
complex perceptual activities, which I will touch upon in the closing section.  
 
JPR and the aporiai 
 
 A broad concern with joint perception can motivate the aporiai that follow [JP:A]. 
AR’s account of the motivation of those aporiai is less successful, especially in the case of 
the second, which gives JPR a distinct advantage. The first aporia is labeled ‘[JP:B]’ above, 
and reads as follows:  
[Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary that it is by sight that one perceives that one 
sees or by another sense.] But [then] the same [sense] would be of sight and of the color which is the 
subject [of sight], with the result that either there will be two [senses] for the same thing, or [the 
sense] itself will be of itself. 
 Aristotle is here concerned with the faculty that is involved in the metaperception. If 
it is sight that sees what is seen, then sight will have to see itself, but if it is not sight, then 
both sight and some other sense will perceive the color.31 This latter possibility seems to be 
                                                 
31 Caston 2002 disagrees with orthodoxy, adopting what he calls an ‘activity reading’ of passage [JP], 
according to which Aristotle is concerned not with the number of senses implicated, but, instead with 
the number of states. We will see in the next section that Aristotle resolves the aporiai by positing a 
single activity that includes both the lower-order perception and the metaperception, so JPR can 
remain neutral as between these rival readings.  
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 precluded by DA II 6, where Aristotle introduces the special objects as those which are unable 
to be perceived by any other sense (418a11-12). 
 According to JPR’s understanding of the explanandum, it is obvious that the 
metaperception must contain the content of the lower-order perception. JPR interprets 
Aristotle as seeking an explanation of the unified perception of the various perceptible 
properties possessed by, e.g., a dog, so any adequate explanation will have to contain those 
properties. If the metaperception does not include the perception of the shapes, colors, and 
sounds of the dog, it will not provide any sort of account of the unified perception of those 
shapes, colors, and sounds. Just as the account of seeing has to include reference to color, so 
too the account of joint perception must include reference to the percepts. The connection is 
so obvious that it doesn’t demand defense—which is why Aristotle doesn’t provide any. 
 However, AR theorists have found the assumption that the metaperception will also 
take on the object of the lower-order perception to be more problematic. As Hamlyn puts it: 
It is not clear why Aristotle supposes this consequence to follow. He seems to assume that if 
I perceive by sense ϒ that I see X, I must therefore perceive X by ϒ […] [O]ne can clearly 
be aware that one is seeing without being aware of what one is seeing. (Hamlyn 2002: 112.)  
Notice that Hamlyn’s worry trades on understanding the explanandum of this section to be 
reflective awareness, leading him to take the introspectively-accessible fact that I can be 
aware of a perception without being aware of what it is a perception of as evidence that 
Aristotle is making an error here.  
 Faced with this difficulty, AR theorists have attempted several accounts of the 
motivation for the aporia. First, it has been observed that the aporia is reminiscent of a claim 
in Charmides.32 At 167c8-d3, Socrates challenges Charmides’s claim that sophrosyne is 
simply self-knowledge—knowledge of knowledge and nothing else—by asking whether in 
an analogous case there could be vision that sees itself but doesn’t see color. It is accepted 
by all parties in the dialogue that this would be absurd, and so it is concluded that sophrosyne 
cannot be this empty kind of self-knowledge.  
 I don’t object to the claim that there is an allusion to Charmides here. But the 
similarity between the two cases cannot adequately motivate the aporia. To see this, recall 
                                                 
32 Caston 2002: 772; Gregoric 2006: 176; Hicks 1907: 434; Johansen 2012: 188; McCabe 2007: 155ff; 
Sorabji 2006: 202. 
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 the dialectical structure of De Anima. When the aporia is introduced, Aristotle has yet to 
conclude that the sense is reflexive: that conclusion awaits the resolution of the second 
aporia. As such, Aristotle has not established that whatever it is that perceives vision must 
itself be a type of vision. The worry in Charmides about how a faculty can be of itself, though, 
trades on just such reflexivity. Plato does not express a general concern with the idea that an 
arbitrary faculty could grasp seeing but not color. The problem is that sight cannot perceive 
itself without seeing color. This follows, as Sorabji notes, because if there is no perception 
of color, we do not have an instance of seeing.33 But the objection only shows that you can’t 
see sight without seeing color, not that you could not otherwise grasp sight without grasping 
color. So if Aristotle has yet to conclude that it is sight that (in a way) sees that it sees, then 
the Charmides worry cannot yet arise. 
 Other commentators attempt to account for Aristotle’s first aporia by appealing to 
his later claim that the actuality of the sense-organ is identical to that of the sensed object.34 
If the perception itself is constituted by the actuality of the sensed object’s potential to be 
perceived, then perceiving the perception will be the same thing as perceiving the actuality 
of its object. This response appears inadequate, though, for Aristotle does not express a 
commitment to this identity until several Bekker lines after the aporia.35 JPR proposes that 
                                                 
33 Sorabji 2006: 202. Polansky 2007 motivates the aporia this way: he says that since color is the 
hupokeimenon of seeing, it must similarly be the hupokeimenon of perceiving seeing (381-382). And 
indeed, Aristotle defines the senses in terms of their objects, which tends to support the idea that all 
seeing ineliminably implicates color. Alexander of Aphrodisias has such a view; he says: “for seeing 
is nothing other than being in activity by sight concerning visible objects” (ou gar esti to horan allo 
ti hê energein têi opsei peri ta horata [Quaest. 3.7, 92.6-7]), and if this is to motivate the first aporia, 
ta horata must be interpreted as referring specifically to colors. It is clear that Alexander expects to 
be so interpreted, since his immediately preceding sentence asserts that the activity of seeing is about 
colors (peri ha hê energeia hê kata to horan, esti de tauta ta chromata [Quaest. 3.7, 92.5-6]). For 
more on Alexander in this context, see Caston 2012.  
34 Gregoric 2006: 178; Johansen 2002: 9; Johansen 2005: 243; Kosman 1975: 514; McCabe 2007: 
148n31; Modrak 1987: 66; Osborne, 1983: 403-404. Kosman takes the aporia to follow only for the 
second disjunct; that is, he says that only if another sense is responsible for the metaperception will 
it follow that that sense will take as its object both sight and the lower-order perceptual object (500), 
whereas Johansen (8) and Osborne (401) both take the aporia to follow no matter what faculty is 
responsible for the metaperception.  
35 Also, the identity Aristotle proposes later on in III 2 is identity in number, not in being. Since the 
AR view takes the metaperception to explain awareness, and awareness introduces an intensional 
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 we read that subsequent commitment as a response to a general worry about the 
multiplication of states that would seem to follow from the metaperception in question. To 
the extent that it is preferable to interpret subsequent claims as resting on prior ones rather 
than the other way around, then, JPR has a superior account of the first aporia.  
 Victor Caston offers a third explanation of the first aporia. He argues that while 
Hamlyn is right to insist that we could be self-conscious without being aware of the content 
of our perceptually conscious states, such a possibility is beside the point. If we understand 
[JP] as attempting to provide an explanation of perceptual consciousness rather than self-
consciousness, it will follow that the contents of lower-order perceptions will have to be 
constituents of the metaperception (Caston 2002: 771). This is, I think, the most promising 
avenue for AR to take. It is similar to JPR’s account in that it holds that what Aristotle is 
explaining here necessitates, in a straightforward sense, that the lower-order content be taken 
on by the higher-order perception.36  
 Recall that, according to JPR, the first aporia follows from the fact that Aristotle is 
providing an account of the perception of similarity and difference: we cannot engage in joint 
perception without perceiving those things that are joined. Caston’s account here proceeds in 
a similar fashion, for we also cannot consciously see red without being conscious of the red. 
Accordingly, there is no decisive objection to this way of motivating the first aporia. I argue, 
though, that JPR is preferable to Caston’s account in that it provides continuity with the 
discussion of joint perception from DA III 1 and does not ascribe a seemingly anachronistic 
interest in consciousness to Aristotle.37 
 JPR has a more distinct advantage over AR in motivating the second aporia. It is 
labeled ‘[JP:C]’ above, and reads as follows: 
                                                 
framework, it would seem identity in being would be necessary to motivate the worry AR theorists 
think Aristotle is expressing here. Caston 2012: 46 directs a similar objection at Kosman’s view.  
36 See also Kosman 1975: 512. 
37 Johansen 2012 argues that Aristotle must think the metaperception will take on the lower-order 
perception because of his particular views on the metaphysics of perception: “Perception, Aristotle 
explained, occurs when the sense-faculty takes on the sensible form of the sense-object. Therefore 
one cannot perceive the perception of that sensible form without also perceiving the sensible form as 
it is taken on by the sense-faculty” (187). His second sentence begs the question, however: why should 
perceiving our perceptions require perceiving the perception of that sensible form? The appeal to his 
formula for perception is not to the point in addressing that question. 
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 [Since we perceive that we see and hear], if the sense for sight were indeed different [from sight] 
either there will be an infinite regress or some sense will be of itself. 
 While Hamlyn’s commentary claims that this aporia is ‘better’ (122), it too stands in 
need of motivation. First, notice that no regress threatens unless it is a necessary fact that we 
perceive our perceptions. If we ‘just so happen’ to have a perception that we see and hear, 
there will be no reason to expect a perception of our perception that we see and hear, much 
less a perception of our perception of our perception that we see and hear. Of course Aristotle 
must resolve this aporia by denying that a regress actually does ensue (regresses are to be 
avoided, after all), which he does in the next line. But why does he think there is a threat of 
regress in the first place? A regress only threatens when the existence of the thing in question 
(in this case a psychological state) requires another thing of the same kind, which in turn 
requires yet another, and so on.38 
 For example, the regress regarding wishing that opens Nicomachean Ethics 
(1094a18-21) only threatens because of Aristotle’s antecedent commitment to the claim that, 
of necessity, everything we wish is wished for the sake of something. Clearly we must also 
wish the end that our wish is for the sake of. So, for example, if I wish for X, I must wish it 
for the sake of something, say Y. Since I also wish for Y, I must in turn wish it for the sake 
of something, and so on.  
 Applied to the case at hand, then, no regress threatens if it is merely a contingent fact 
that we perceive that we see and hear. In other words, the threat of a regress is predicated on 
the presupposition that all perceptions, not just lower-order seeings and hearings, must 
themselves be perceived: in order for the perception to exist, it must rely on another thing of 
the same type, i.e. another perception. Why would Aristotle assume that all perceptions must 
themselves be perceived?  
 JPR again provides a straightforward justification for this assumption. Since our 
perceptual experience of the world always implicates unified perceptual activities such as 
joint perception, this metaperceptual apparatus must operate whenever we perceive. But if 
                                                 
38 Johansen 2002 sees regress as a problem even though he interprets Aristotle as thinking that the 
metaperception is contingent. In reply, Kosman 2007 contends that the regress requires more than 
mere contingency (See also Kosman 1975: 501). McCabe 2007 also argues that a faculty reading (see 
Caston 2002) can motivate the regress even if the point is only that each perception is perceivable 
(i.e. even if it is not the case that each perception is actually itself perceived) (151-3). 
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 there were multiple simultaneous activities of the apparatus, the metaperception would not 
provide the requisite unity and our experience would be disjoint, which would introduce the 
need for another higher-order perceptual state that unifies these disparate activities, and so 
on.  
 But while the necessity of metaperception follows straightforwardly from JPR, AR 
theorists face considerable obstacles. In fact, the very reasons one might have for adopting a 
metaperceptual account of conscious awareness tell against claiming that all of our 
perceptions must themselves be perceived. To see this, recall that AR views, despite 
substantial disagreement on the details, hold that the metaperception is the mechanism by 
which we are made aware of some particular perception, a perception that would not 
otherwise be conscious.39 According to the AR view, then, Aristotle is concerned in this 
aporia with cutting off a regress that would effectively make us aware of an endless series 
of nested perceptual states.  Furthermore, since Aristotle must think that the metaperception 
is necessary in order to get the regress worry going, he must be interpreted as assuming that 
being aware of any perception would somehow require us to be aware of these endless states. 
The implausibility of such a conclusion undermines the reasonableness of the initial 
assumption: why wouldn’t Aristotle choose to deny that every perception must itself be 
perceived rather than accept the possibility that the regress opens up?  
 Caston suggests that while we can find no compelling independent reason for the 
worry, it is clear that Aristotle is committed to the general principle that we perceive all of 
our perceptions. In any event, he says, ‘Aristotle may view it … as an acceptable 
generalization of the opening of the chapter, when he claims that we perceive that we see and 
hear’ (2002: 774). For support Caston turns to Nicomachean Ethics IX 9 1170a29ff, where 
Aristotle claims that there is something in us that perceives all of our activities. Caston does 
not himself endorse the generalized claim (indeed, he notes that it is ‘obviously controversial’ 
(2002: 775)), but he takes the Nicomachean Ethics passage as sufficient evidence that 
Aristotle would accept the premise.  
                                                 
39 If it were thought that the perception would be conscious even if it were not the subject of a 
metaperception, then that metaperception would not explain our conscious awareness of it. 
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  The first claim Caston makes here—that it is an acceptable generalization—has 
already been addressed. For while it may at first have struck Aristotle this way, the absurdity 
of accepting it in its general form ought to have led him to reject it.40 On the contrary, it must 
be that Aristotle is independently committed to the principle. That commitment is sufficiently 
motivated by JPR: joint perception requires that a single perceptual state actualizes all of the 
contents that are perceived jointly. If there were multiple states, they would need to be joined 
by a further perception of those (distinct) perceptions—and then that perception would have 
to be numerically singular. The metaperceptual apparatus must bottom out in a single state 
that perceives itself: insofar as that state is meant to supply unity, a regress threatens until 
that unity is achieved.  
 It certainly is true, as we have seen, that Aristotle thinks that we perceive all of our 
perceptions, and the Nicomachean Ethics passage further illustrates that commitment. But I 
suggest that it is Aristotle’s adoption of the necessity principle in DA III 2 that motivates his 
broadening of that principle in Nicomachean Ethics—not, as Caston would have it, the other 
way around. Indeed, I take the Nicomachean Ethics passage as providing further support for 
JPR, for it is yet another instance where metaperceptions are invoked in order to account for 
a kind of psychological unity.41 
 Accordingly, while in some of its forms AR is able to motivate the first aporia, it is 
unable to motivate the second. Since both aporiai clearly follow if Aristotle is concerned 






                                                 
40 In addition, note that as a generalization it seems false. As Plotinus observes, we are not always 
conscious of engaging in psychological activity (Enneads 1.4 10,21-29): while it seems plausible to 
suppose that when awake we are always perceptually conscious, it is much less reasonable to assume 
that we are always reflectively-conscious. But if that is right, then we have subjective grounds for 
rejecting the necessity claim—grounds that are, moreover, independent of the dialectical ones 
adduced above.  
41 For more on other passages seemingly related to the opening of DA III 2, see §4. 
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 The Resolution of the aporiai 
 
 At the end of [JP], Aristotle concludes that since some sense must perceive its own 
activity, it is best to claim that the initial sense does so. But Aristotle’s view is not quite so 
straightforward, as is clear when he elaborates on his position using the example of sight:  
But this presents a difficulty, for if to perceive by sight is to see, and if one sees color or that 
which has color, then if one sees that which sees, that which sees primarily will have color. 
It is clear then that to perceive by sight is not one thing, for even when we do not see, it is by 
sight that we discriminate darkness and light, though not in the same way. (425b17-22) 
 It is by sight that we perceive darkness, but it is not by seeing. When one perceives 
darkness, one is not, it seems, seeing any color at all. Yet clearly one’s perception of darkness 
(or light) is dependent on the capacity for sight more than it is on the capacity for, say, 
hearing. So too with metaperceiving: perceiving yellow, bitter bile is dependent on sight and 
taste more than on any other perceptual (or non-perceptual) capacity. As Aristotle resolves 
the aporiai, he notes that perceiving that I see is not just the act of perceiving color, for it is 
also, at a minimum, perceiving the activity of the sense itself. As in the case of perceiving 
darkness, the fact that the metaperception takes in something other than color means that it 
is not merely the special sense doing its paradigmatic work. Nonetheless, the perception that 
I am seeing is dependent on the sense of sight, and as such, it is correct to say that perceiving 
that I see is a product of sight, even though it is not strictly an act of seeing. The upshot of 
this conclusion, according to JPR, is that the activity of the five senses suffices for the 
possibility of joint perception: as he puts it in DA III 1, “there is no other sense besides the 
five [special senses]” [424b22]. 
  In the long passage from DS 7 quoted above (449a8-20), Aristotle says that joint 
perception implicates only one faculty, which may initially be thought to be in some conflict 
with the conclusion here. But, as he also stresses there, the account of that faculty will not be 
univocal: he concludes that “[we] can perceive simultaneously with one and the same 
[faculty], but its account is not the same” [449a19-20]. There will be separate accounts of 
each sense, and those accounts, given in DA II 7-11, will make reference to the special objects 
of each sense, the organs used, and the relevant media. As he resolves the aporiai of [JP], it 
becomes clear that while the accounts of the individual senses do not refer to their role in 
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 joint perception, the senses can and do participate. Since joint perception is no part of the 
account of each sense, though, the activity of joint perception is not felicitously described as 
an activity of seeing, or of hearing, and so on. Nonetheless, joint perception is ontologically 
reducible to activities including seeing or hearing—that is, it is nothing over-and-above 
seeings and hearings.42 We have, then, an account of how the senses can converge without 
requiring a distinct sixth sense, and that account proceeds via the invocation of a 
metaperceptual apparatus.  
 So unified perception does not require a sixth, emergent, sense. But that conclusion 
does not allay all concerns about joint perception. For as discussed above, joint perception 
also depends on there being only one activity. As such, the claim that sight in a way perceives 
that it sees needs to be supplemented with the further claim that it perceives that it sees in the 
very same activity as it does the lower-order seeing. This introduces a further problem: how 
can it be that metaperceptions are identical to their lower-order counterparts? Initially, it 
would seem that perceptions of our perceptions would be numerically distinct from those 
perceptions themselves; yet if Aristotle is to provide an explanation of joint perception, then 
he has to reject that appearance.43 And indeed he does just that, for his very next point is that 
the activity of the sense is the same activity as that of the object that is sensed (425b26-27). 
In this way, then, the perception of my seeing will be numerically identical to the seeing 
                                                 
42 In his discussion of DS 7 449a5-20, Gregoric says that the common capacity “emerges from the 
unity of the perceptual part of the soul” [Gregoric 2006: 137-8, emphasis added], but he gives no 
argument that it is an emergent quality. In fact, since Gregoric calls this passage “the solution to the 
problem of simultaneous perception” (135), and since Aristotle here claims that the perceptual faculty 
is one in number and divided only in account, Gregoric ought to take it that the unity of the perceptual 
part of the soul just is the solution, not that the unity underpins a separate capacity not possessed by 
the senses themselves.  
43 Indeed, the Commentators were known to object to the idea that a sense can perceive itself precisely 
by denying that a sense can get the proper remove from itself. This was thought to be true in virtue 
of the bodily nature of the senses, and the inability of a spatially extended thing to stand at a remove 
from itself. See, for instance, [Philoponus] De An. 466,18-29; [Simplicius] De An. 173,3-7. Aristotle 
would presumably deny that both the sense itself and its activity are bodily: while the sense relies on 
an organ, that organ is not identical to the sense. Similarly, in the activity of perception, the organ 
might undergo some qualitative alteration, but that alteration shouldn’t be understood as constitutive 
of perception. Both of these claims are controversial; see the references in fn. 26. In any event, 
Aristotle does not seem to have considered this type of objection. 
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 itself, and also to the being-seen that attaches to the perceptible object.44 Thus, the resolution 
of the aporiai is able to explain how perceptual complexity is possible—how it is that one 
perceptual activity is able to actualize multiple perceptual potentialities. On Aristotle’s view, 
one activity can be described variously as the seeing of yellow, the tasting of bitter, and the 
perceiving of the seeing of yellow and tasting of bitter, and the singleness of the activity 
accounts for the unity of the perceptual contents.45 
 
JPR and Consciousness  
 
 We have already seen that AR has difficulty motivating the aporiai that follow from 
our master passage [JP], but a more general problem with its claim that consciousness is the 
subject of that passage is its anachronism. While state consciousness as a phenomenon has a 
long history of recognition in philosophy, as a problem it is not prominent in the classical 
period.46 Aristotle does arguably acknowledge conscious awareness in a variety of places, 
but he does not seem to think that it introduces any added difficulties. In Metaphysics Λ.9, 
for instance, he says that knowledge, perception, and thought are ‘about themselves on the 
side’ (autês en parergôi) [1074b36]. More explicitly, in Physics VII 2 244b15-245a1, 
Aristotle notes that animate creatures, when altered in respect of the senses, are not unaware 
of being affected (to [d’] ou lanthanei paschon), and he goes on to claim that such creatures 
may be unaware of being affected if those affections are not alterations by means of the 
                                                 
44 That is, given the transitivity of numerical identity, if the perception and the perceived object are 
jointly actualized, and the perception of the perception and the perception are jointly actualized, then 
the perception of the perception and the activity of the perceived object are also jointly actualized. 
45 Contra Marmodoro 2014’s reading, which holds that there are two separate activations—one the 
activation of the potential of the perceiver and one the activation of the potential of the perceived—
which Aristotle calls one activity only because they are mutually dependent, simultaneous, and co-
vary (94). This is a corollary of her reading of Physics III.3, see n. 16.  
46 My focus in this section is on perceptual state consciousness. Certainly there is no precedent in 
Plato for viewing state consciousness as a problematic feature of psychology. See Hardie 1964; Kahn 
1975: 22-3; McCabe 2007: 146-7. Creature consciousness is similarly not taken to be a problem: 
living and non-living things are distinguished by whether they possess a soul, and while living things 
like oysters are not sophisticated, there is no suggestion that they might lack basic awareness. Self-
consciousness and the joint awareness of perceptions and thoughts together may raise special 
problems, which Aristotle discusses in NE IX. 9 1170a25ff, again invoking a metaperceptual 
apparatus. 
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 senses. The introduction of modality in the latter case—non-perceptual alteration may escape 
our notice—suggests an inverse commitment in the former case: perceptual alteration must 
not escape our notice. Thus, it would seem, Aristotle thinks of awareness of a perception as 
a necessary condition for its being a perception in the first place. 
 In a much-discussed passage, DA II 12 424b16-18, Aristotle asks what constitutes 
smelling beyond its being an affection (ti oun esti to osmasthai para to paschein ti;). He 
presents one (and only one) possible answer, viz. that smelling is perception (ê to osmasthai 
aisthanesthai).47 Given that the Physics passage above distinguishes perceptual affections 
from non-perceptual ones in virtue of the fact that the former do not escape our notice, it 
would seem he is here indicating that the difference is one of awareness; smelling is not a 
mere affection because we are aware we are smelling. Moreover, Aristotle seems to think 
that describing smelling as a perceptual affection suffices to distinguish it from nonconscious 
types of affection. Since he takes this response as an adequate answer to the underlying 
question, it is unlikely that he thinks of consciousness of our perceptions as an additional fact 
over-and-above their being perceptions. As such, we have grounds to conclude that his 
account of perception just is an account of conscious perception; there is no reason to think 
that Aristotle views perceptual consciousness as a distinct phenomenon that stands in need 
of its own account. Indeed, the only passage where he is even alleged to give an account of 
awareness is the passage in question, and, I have argued, there is no compelling reason to 
read the [JP] in this way.48 
 
Common Sensing and Other Activities of Complex Perception 
 
 I have limited myself here to an extended discussion of joint perception. I do this 
because it is this phenomenon Aristotle has immediately in mind when he introduces the 
metaperceptual apparatus in DA III 2, and because between there and DS 7 he says 
(comparably) a lot about the topic. However, joint perception is not the only instance of 
complex perception, i.e. of perception that goes beyond the reception of the special objects 
                                                 
47 Or, accepting Torstrik’s emendation, ê to osmasthai kai aisthanesthai.  
48 According to [Simplicius] (De. An. 188,4-5), Aristotle thinks that perceiving that we see and hear 
is a consequence of consciousness (ek tês hêmeteras sunaithêseôs), not the cause.  
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 by the special senses. If Aristotle is to defend the completeness of his theory of perception, 
all such activities must be explicable in terms of the activity of the five senses. We have 
already seen that metaperception does not require invoking any additional sense, so it would 
be parsimonious to give a similar account of other instances of complex perception. And in 
fact, if we look at his discussions of things like perceptual discrimination and sleep, we do 
find a similar response.  
 In De Somno (DSV) 2, for instance, Aristotle finds himself appealing to a 
metaperception in the context of another unified perceptual phenomenon—in this case 
perceptual discrimination49—and he again draws the conclusion that the senses do not engage 
in these activities in virtue of being the particular senses they are, but, rather, in virtue of the 
element common to each of them. There he says: 
[A] Since each sense has something special and something common—for example, seeing is special 
to sight, and hearing to the sense of hearing, and the same way for each one of the other [senses]—
[B] there is some common potentiality accompanying all of them by which one also perceives that he 
sees and hears [C] (for of course at any rate it is not by sight that one sees that one sees, [D] and 
certainly one discriminates, and is able to discriminate, that sweet things are different from white 
things neither by taste nor by sight nor by both, [E] but by some common part of all sense-organs; [F] 
for there is a single sense, and the proper sense-organ is single, but the being of the perception of 
sound is one genus and the being of the perception of color is another). [455a12-22]50 
 At [A], Aristotle again observes that the senses have powers beyond the paradigmatic 
ones that make each sense unique, and it is in virtue of those common powers, as he says at 
[E], that we are able to discriminate (and, later, in virtue of which we are able to sleep and 
                                                 
49 Aristotle also addresses perceptual discrimination later in De Anima III.2, and there it is clear that 
it too depends on the unity of the perceptual faculty: “Indeed, neither is it possible to discriminate by 
separate means that sweet is other than white, but both must be evident to some one thing—for 
otherwise even if I perceived one thing and you another, it would be clear that they were different 
from each other. But it is evident that one thing says that they are different; for sweet is different from 
white. Therefore the same thing says [this]; just as it says so it both thinks and perceives—then it is 
clear that it is not possible to discriminate separate things by separate means” [DA III.2 426b17-23].  
50 There is a tension between this passage and the DA III.2 425b12ff on the issue of whether it is by 
sight that we perceive that we see: here he says it is not, yet there he implies it is. Some, like Hicks, 
have seen a very serious conflict here, but I agree with Johansen 2012, p. 196-198 that the difference 
is merely one of focus—in De Somno Aristotle is focusing on the fact that it is not by sight qua special 
sense that we perceive that we see; in DA he is trying to provide a reduction, so he wants to show that 
we don’t require anything beyond sight as a general faculty in order to account for perceiving that we 
see. See also Hamlyn 1968: 202.  
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 wake).51 Now if we take it that the accounts of discrimination and joint perception will share 
significant features52, then we shouldn’t be surprised to see Aristotle appealing to perceiving 
that we perceive in this context. And indeed, the fact that he introduces metaperceiving via 
the instrumental dative (hêi kai hoti horâi kai akouei aisthanetai) is strong support for JPR: 
it is by perceiving that we perceive that the common potentiality of each of the senses is 
actualized. Metaperceptions are then able to provide the means by which we discriminate—
and, I have already argued, jointly perceive—in virtue of the fact that the perceptual faculty 
has the potential to perceive its own perceptions, and these functions are performed when 
that potentiality is actualized. When that potentiality lay dormant, on the other hand, we are 
said to be asleep. 
 Gregoric agrees that “perceiving that we see and hear” in DSV 2 is not an arbitrarily 
chosen example of perceptual activity. He notes that Aristotle calls it the “common function” 
of the common power, and he later says that this type of perceiving must be “something 
characteristic of waking, and its lack something characteristic of sleep” if the argument is to 
work (2006: 165, 168). Gregoric concludes that the criterial waking activity is simple 
awareness that our senses are in activity.53 But it is far from obvious that this type of 
awareness is especially characteristic of waking life, nor is it obvious that a failure to be 
aware that our senses are active is characteristic of sleeping.54 Moreover, Gregoric has no 
                                                 
51 Caston 2002: 779; Gregoric 2006: 165 and Kosman 1975: 517-8 take this passage from DSV to 
support the view that the common potentiality should be thought of as only arising from the joint 
operation of the senses and not therefore as being possessed by the senses considered individually. 
None address the fact that Aristotle here says that each sense (note the singular) has something 
common, nor that, at 455a22-23, Aristotle says that touch shares most of all in the common 
potentiality in virtue of the fact that it is separable from the other special senses. Marmodoro 2014 
adopts an intermediate position, according to which “each special sense has two types of power: a 
special one … and a common one with other senses, in which it participates” but nonetheless “the 
common power will not be ‘common’ as a power that is simply replicated in each of the special 
senses, since this would only endow each of the special senses with an additional set of capabilities 
each of them can exercise. Rather, what Aristotle attributes to the special senses is a common power 
that is shared across the special senses, owned jointly by all of them.” (260-261)  
52 We have already seen that both require that perception be unified, cf. fn. 49. 
53 Gregoric 2006: 174-189 gives the same account of the explanandum of our master passage [JP].   
54 We spend many waking hours attending to what we are seeing and hearing (Gregoric ascribes 
perceptual consciousness to the individual senses (Gregoric 2006: 170)), but not nearly as many 
attending to the fact that our senses of sight and hearing are active. 
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 account of why Aristotle mentions perceptual discrimination at all. Discriminating is 
certainly not criterial of being awake, for while it is presumably true that one does not 
discriminate when she is asleep, it is not the case that one is always discriminating while 
awake. 
 A preferable reading is the following: earlier in DSV 2, Aristotle notes that, in sleep, 
all of the senses must be dormant simultaneously [455a9-12]. But if simultaneous inactivity 
is not a massive coincidence, the senses must be united so that they can be turned on and off 
together. In the quoted passage, then, Aristotle points out that he has in fact already55 
provided for such a unity, in virtue of the sense faculty’s ability to perceive that we see and 
hear. He illustrates this again, but this time by reference to perceptual discrimination. Here 
the point seems to be that since it is clear that we can discriminate, and since discrimination 
requires that we perceive that we see and hear, we do perceive that we see and hear. But if 
we can perceive that we see and hear, then the senses are unified. Accordingly, their unified 
inhibition in the context of sleep introduces no further complications. Aristotle concludes the 
quoted passage by giving his by-now characteristic explanation of the unified faculty: while 




 Theaetetus raises a problem for Aristotle: it claims that we cannot perceive cross-
modally, which is a conclusion that Aristotle cannot accept. Given the commonalities that 
obtain between Aristotle’s view on perception and the ‘Heraclitean’ view on offer in 
Theaetetus, Aristotle cannot merely assume that joint perception is possible. Instead, he must 
show how his theory of perception has the tools to account for it. 
 In this paper, I argued that Aristotle recognized and discharged this obligation in DS 
7 and DA III 1-2. First, I showed that he thinks that having a numerically single perception 
is necessary and sufficient for the apparent unity of that perception. I next argued that the 
opening of DA III 2—generally thought to be directed towards questions of conscious 
awareness—is better interpreted as addressing joint perception.  Those traditional readings 
                                                 
55 Earlier in the same DSV chapter [455a8-9]. Aristotle explicitly refers to De Anima. 
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of the opening of III 2, which I grouped under the heading of ‘Awareness Readings’, were 
rejected because they were unable to account for the attendant aporiai, especially the second. 
The Joint Perception Reading, by contrast, is supported by those aporiai, and especially by 
their resolution: if the metaperception and the perception are numerically identical, then we 
have the single, unified state that Aristotle seeks out in DS 7 and DA III 1. The metaperceptual 
account on offer in DA III 2 may also apply to other complex activities, in which case it may 
be understood as an account of common sensing in general, making Aristotle’s account of 
perception complete and parsimonious, but demonstrating that goes beyond the scope of this 
paper.56 
Rosemary Twomey 
Queens College CUNY 
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